

Message Text

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AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 8 MBFR VIENNA 0089

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: INFORMAL SESSION WITH EASTERN

REPS JUNE 18, 1974

REF: MBFR VIENNA 0087

FOLLOWING IS CONTINUATION OF REPORT OF INFORMAL
SESSION WITH EASTERN REPS ON JUNE 18, 1974. PARAGRAPHS
1 THROUGH 5 CONTAINING SUMMARY TRANSMITTED REFTEL.

6. UK REP AS HOST WELCOMED PARTICIPANTS IN SESSION.
DRAWING ON TALKING POINTS APPROVED BY AD HOC GROUP,
UK REP CONTINUED THAT, IN LAST SESSION ON JUNE 11,
KHLESTOV HAD PROPOSED THAT PARTICIPANTS CONSIDER THE
POSSIBILITY OF AN INITIAL REDUCTION AGREEMENT ON
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WHICH FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS WOULD FOLLOW. AMBASSADOR

KHLESTOV HAD ALSO IDENTIFIED THREE ELEMENTS TO WHICH ANSWERS WOULD HAVE TO BE FOUND IN THE COURSE OF REACHING THE INITIAL REDUCTION AGREEMENT EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAD IN MIND. THEY WERE: (A) WHICH COUNTRIES WOULD ASSUME OBLIGATIONS TO REDUCE; (B) WHAT THE SCOPE OF REDUCTIONS WOULD BE; AND (C) WHAT KIND OF TROOPS WOULD BE INVOLVED. DURING THE SAME SESSION, MR STRULAK HAD SUGGESTED THAT AN INITIAL REDUCTION AGREEMENT SHOULD HAVE LANGUAGE PROVIDING FOR THE CONTINUATION OF NEGOTIATIONS IN A LATER STAGE OF NEGOTIATION. IN THE LAST SESSION, AMBASSADOR KHLESTOV HAD ALSO INDICATED THAT SOME WAY MIGHT BE FOUND TO DEAL WITH THE ISSUE OF WESTERN OPPOSITION TO THE EARLIER EASTERN SUGGESTION, PUT FORWARD DURING DISCUSSION OF A SYMBOLIC REDUCTION CONCEPT IN THE LAST ROUND, OF A GLOBAL OR OVERALL CEILING ON THE MANPOWER OF BOTH SIDES. BOTH MR STRULAK AND MR OESER, HAD IN LAST SESSION INDICATED THAT THEY EXPECTED THE TOTAL OF INITIAL REDUCTIONS TO BE SUBSTANTIAL. ALLIED REPS FELT THAT THESE WERE USEFUL POINTS TO BE KEPT IN MIND.

7. UK REP CONTINUED THAT, AT PRESENT, PARTICIPANTS WERE ENGAGED, BY COMMON AGREEMENT, WHICH HAD BEEN RE-AFFIRMED BY AMBASSADOR KHLESTOV IN HIS PLENARY STATEMENT OF JUNE 6, IN THE EFFORT TO FIND A SOLUTION TO THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. PARTICIPANTS HAD AGREED TO GIVE PRIORITY TO THIS QUESTION AND THERE WERE GOOD REASONS FOR MAINTAINING THIS AGREED PRIORITY. THEREFORE, PARTICIPANTS SHOULD CONTINUE MOVING TOWARDS A FIRST AGREEMENT ON REDUCTIONS BY THE AGREED ROUTE OF REACHING IN THE FIRST PLACE A TENTATIVE UNDERSTANDING ON THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET AND THEN GO ON TO OTHER QUESTIONS.

8. UK REP SAID THAT ALLIED REPS HAD NOTED IN THE LAST SESSION OF GROUP THAT, AS REGARDS EARLIER DISCUSSION OF QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE

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REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET, THERE WAS ONE POINT OF SIMILARITY: BOTH SIDES AGREED THAT, OF THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, AT LEAST US AND SOVIET FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. IN LAST SESSION, ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES HAD ALSO POINTED OUT THAT, AT THE OUTSET OF DISCUSSION OF THIS QUESTION, THE EASTERN POSITION HAD BEEN THAT THE REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD UNDERTAKE A COMMITMENT

THAT THEY WOULD REDUCE THEIR FORCES FROM THE OUTSET.
ON THE OTHER HAND, THE WESTERN POSITION AT THE
OUTSET HAD BEEN THAT THE REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT
PARTICIPANTS SHOULD UNDERTAKE NO SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS
IN PHASE I APPLYING TO THEIR OWN FORCES, BUT SHOULD
WAIT TO DO SO UNTIL THEY GAINED THE NECESSARY
ASSURANCE FROM A SATISFACTORY PHASE I AGREEMENT.
IN LAST SESSION, THE UK REPRESENTATIVE HIMSELF HAD
SUGGESTED THAT PARTICIPANTS APPLY AMBASSADOR
KHLESTOV'S USEFUL SUGGESTION THAT WHAT THEY SHOULD
BE LOOKING FOR NOW WAS SOME MIDDLE GROUND BETWEEN
THE POSITIONS OF BOTH SIDES, TO THE QUESTION OF
WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. AT
THAT TIME, ALLIED REPS HAD IDENTIFIED THE MIDDLE
GROUND BETWEEN THE TWO DIVERGING POSITIONS HE HAD
DESCRIBED AS THE WILLINGNESS OF ALL DIRECT
PARTICIPANTS OTHER THAN THE US AND USSR TO ACCEPT
IN A FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT SIGNIFICANT OBLIGATIONS
RELATED TO THEIR FORCES. ALLIED REPS HAD POINTED
OUT THAT THEY HAD ALREADY MODIFIED THEIR INITIAL
POSITION IN ORDER TO MOVE TO THAT MIDDLE GROUND:
THEY HAD COMMITTED THEMSELVES THAT PHASE II REDUC-
TIONS WOULD FOCUS ON THE FORCES OF OTHER WESTERN

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FROM US REP MBFR

DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. MORE RECENTLY, THEY HAD EXPRESSED THEIR WILLINGNESS TO UNDERTAKE A COMMITMENT NOT TO INCREASE THE OVERALL LEVEL OF THEIR GROUND FORCE MANPOWER BETWEEN THE PHASES OF NEGOTIATION. TO RECAPITULATE: BOTH SIDES AGREED ON US AND SOVIET REDUCTIONS FROM THE OUTSET. SO THE REAL QUESTION REMAINING IN THIS CONTEXT, WAS, WHAT KIND OF COMMITMENTS OR OBLIGATIONS SHOULD THE REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TAKE WITH REGARD TO THEIR FORCES FROM THE OUTSET?

9. UK REPS SAID THAT, IN THE JUNE 11 SESSION, AMBASSADOR KHLESTOV HAD INDICATED THAT HE DISAGREED WITH THE WESTERN VIEW OF WHERE THE MIDDLE GROUND BETWEEN THE POSITIONS OF THE TWO
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SIDES WAS. HE WENT ON TO INDICATE THAT HIS REACTION MIGHT BE DIFFERENT IF ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WERE TO ASSUME AN OBLIGATION TO REDUCE, ALONG WITH SOME SUGGESTION AS TO THE TIMETABLE FOR THOSE REDUCTIONS. THIS WAS AN INTERESTING COMMENT. BUT, AS REGARDS THE ISSUE OF TIMETABLE, ALLIED REPS HAD ALREADY SAID THAT THE SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATION COULD BEGIN WITHIN A FIXED PERIOD OF TIME WHICH THEY WERE READY TO WORK OUT WITH EAST. ALLIED REPS HAD SAID THAT A NO-INCREASE COMMITMENT SHOULD HAVE A FIXED DURATION WHICH THEY WERE ALSO WILLING TO WORK OUT WITH EAST. AND ALLIED REPS HAD SAID THAT A REVIEW PROVISION WOULD PROVIDE FOR REVIEW WITHIN A SPECIFIED PERIOD OF TIME, WHOSE DURATION THEY WERE READY TO WORK OUT WITH EAST.

10. THUS, ALLIED REPS HAD ALREADY TOLD THAT THEY WERE WILLING TO WORK OUT WITH EAST A REASONABLE TIME SCHEDULE. THAT SCHEDULE WOULD ESTABLISH WHEN PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS WOULD START, AND THE GENERAL TIME FRAME WITHIN WHICH PARTICIPANTS WOULD EXPECT TO REACH AGREEMENT ON PHASE II REDUCTIONS. IN THE UNLIKELY EVENT THAT THESE NEGOTIATIONS DID NOT HAVE AN OUTCOME, THE REVIEW PROVISION WOULD PROVIDE A MEANS OR REDRESS

WITHIN A SPECIFIED PERIOD.

11. UK REP SAID THAT WITH RESPECT TO AMBASSADOR KHLESTOV'S POINT ABOUT AN OBLIGATION TO REDUCE, IT SHOULD BE KEPT IN MIND, FIRST, THAT THE ALLIED HAD STATED THAT, IN THE EVENT OF A SATISFACTORY PHASE I AGREEMENT, THE WESTERN CONTRIBUTION TO REDUCTIONS IN THE SECOND PHASE WOULD FOCUS ON THE FORCES OF OTHER WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. SECOND, THE WEST HAD SUGGESTED THAT PARTICIPANTS COULD AGREE DURING THE FIRST PHASE ON THE OVERALL NUMERICAL DIMENSIONS OF THE REDUCTIONS TO BE TAKEN IN BOTH PHASES. THAT IS TO SAY THAT, IF PARTICIPANTS SHOULD COME TO AGREEMENT IN PHASE I ON A SPECIFIC COMMON OVERALL FORCE LEVEL AS AN OUTCOME OF THE TWO PHASES, THIS WOULD OF COURSE REPRESENT A COMMITMENT FOR BOTH
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SIDES TO REDUCE FORCES IN THE SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS TO THE LEVEL INDICATED. TO SUMMARIZE, ALLIED REPS FELT THAT WILLINGNESS TO UNDERTAKE SIGNIFICANT OBLIGATIONS DID REPRESENT THE MIDDLE GROUND BETWEEN NO OBLIGATIONS FOR REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS AND OBLIGATIONS BY THIS GROUP TO REDUCE FROM THE OUTSET. THEY FELT THAT THEY HAD DEMONSTRATED THEIR READINESS TO UNDERTAKE COMMITMENTS WHICH ARE SIGNIFICANT. THEY BELIEVED EAST SHOULD JOIN WEST AT THIS MIDDLE POSITION BY MAKING SOME MOVES OF SIGNIFICANCE EQUIVALENT TO THOSE WEST HAD ALREADY MADE.

12. SOVIET REP KHLESTOV RESPONDED. HE SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO STATE SOME OF HIS VIEWS REGARDING WHAT UK REP HAD SAID AND REGARDING ALL OF THE QUESTIONS CONCERNED IN THE PRESENT ROUND OF DISCUSSIONS. AT THE INFORMAL SESSION ON JUNE 11, CONSIDERABLE ATTENTION HAD BEEN PAID DURING DISCUSSION OF THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED AT THE OUTSET TO THE IDEA OF WORKING OUT AN INITIAL STEP ELATED TO THE REDUCTION OF FORCES AND ARAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. IN THIS CONNECTION, HE WOULD LIKE TO COMMENT ON UK REP'S REMARKS THAT THAT PARTICIPANTS HAD AGREED TO GIVE PRIORITY TO SOME QUESTIONS, ESPECIALLY TO QUESTION OF WHO SHOULD REDUCE FROM THE OUTSET. IT WAS TRUE THAT IT HAD BEEN AGREED TO FIRST DISCUSS THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD REDUCE FROM THE OUTSET AND THEN TO GO ON TO DISCUSS OTHER QUESTIONS. BUT IT SEEMED TO HIM THAT PARTICIPANTS HAD IN ADDITION REACHED AN UNDERSTANDING THAT WHILE DISCUSSING THE FIRST QUESTION, THEY SHOULD ALSO DISCUSS THE REMAINING

TWO QUESTIONS MENTIONED BY UK REP BECAUSE ALL
THREE WERE INTER-RELATED. IN OTHER WORDS,
AN UNDERSTANDING HAD BEEN REACHED THAT PRIORITY
SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE FIRST QUESTION, BUT THAT THIS
PRIORITY SHOULD NOT BE REGIDLY APPLIED AND THAT PARTICIPANTS
COULD ALSO PURSUE THE REMAINING TWO ISSUES.
HE BELIEVED PARTICIPANTS SHOULD STICK TO THE
APPROACH HE HAD JUST DESCRIBED.

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13. KHLESTOV SAID ANOTHER POINT HE WOULD LIKE TO
EMPHASIZE WAS, THE USE WESTERN LANGUAGE, THAT BOTH
SIDES HAD AGREED THAT THEY SHOULD SEEK AN INITIAL STEP.
HE WISHED ALSO

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FROM US REP MBFR

TO TAKE NOTE OF UK REP'S COMMENT THAT, IN RESPONSE TO USEFUL EASTERN SUGGESTIONS, THE WESTERN SIDE HAD CHANGED ITS POSITION AND WAS NOW READY TO MOVE TO MIDDLE GROUND IN ORDER TO SEEK AN INITIAL STEP. IN THE LIGHT OF THIS STATEMENT, HE WOULD NOT REPEAT THE REASONS WHY IT WAS DESIRABLE TO SEEK AN INITIAL STEP. ALLIED REPS WOULD PROBABLY RECALL EASTERN VIEW THAT SUCH AN INITIAL STEP WOULD DEMONSTRATE THE PRACTICAL WILLINGNESS OF THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TO MOVE FORWARD ON THE WAY TO MUTUAL REDUCTION OF FORCES. EASTERN REPS HAD ALSO MENTIONED THAT IN TAKING SUCH AN INITIAL STEP, PARTICIPANTS WOULD ACQUIRE EXPERIENCE WHICH WOULD BE USEFUL LATER. AS HE NOW UNDERSTOOD IT, THEN, PARTICIPANTS COULD PROCEED TO SEARCH FOR AN INITIAL STEP, NATURALLY WITHOUT VIOLATING THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY WHICH EASTERN REPS HAD EMPHASIZED AT THE LAST SESSION. NATURALLY, WESTERN REPS WOULD ALSO HAVE TAKEN
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NOTE OF REMARKS MADE BY SOVIET REPS AND BY POLISH REP IN PAST SESSIONS THAT AFTER A FIRST STEP AGREEMENT, NEGOTIATIONS WOULD NOT BE INTERRUPTED NOR HELD BACK BUT WOULD BE PURSUED. IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT WESTERN REPS HAD EXPRESSED THEIR WILLINGNESS TO SEARCH FOR AN INITIAL REDUCTION STEP, IT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE FOR EASTERN REPS TO STATE WHAT THEY THOUGHT SUCH A STEP COULD INCLUDE.

14. KHLESTOV SAID UK REP HAD JUST TRIED TO PROVE TO EASTERN REPS THAT THE WESTERN SUGGESTION OF A NON-INCREASE FORMULA FOR GROUND FORCE MANPOWER BETWEEN THE TWO PHASES OF NEGOTIATION WAS IN FACT A MIDDLE GROUND SOLUTION AND THAT WEST HAD ALREADY MOVED IN THIS DIRECTION. UNFORTUNATELY, HE COULD NOT SHARE THESE ARGUMENTS FOR A NUMBER OF REASONS. FIRST, EASTERN REPS BELIEVED THAT THE WESTERN REDUCTION PLAN AS PROPOSED WAS NEITHER EQUITABLE NOR FAIR. THIS PLAN RAN COUNTER TO THE AGREED PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY AS DECIDED DURING THE PREPARATORY CONSULTATIONS, AND SPECIFICALLY TO THE AGREEMENT THAT THIS PRINCIPLE SHOULD BE APPLIED IN EVERY RESPECT AND AT EVERY POINT. SECONDLY, THE PROPOSAL THAT THERE BE NO INCREASE IN THE OVERALL GROUND FORCE MANPOWER OF BOTH SIDES BETWEEN THE TWO PHASES OF NEGOTIATION WAS OBVIOUSLY CLOSELY CONNECTED WITH THE WESTERN REDUCTION PLAN. IN FACT, UK REP, IN SUMMING UP THE POSITION OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES IN THE PRESENT SESSION HAD EMPHASIZED THAT THIS NO-INCREASE COMMITMENT WOULD BE IN EFFECT BETWEEN TWO PHASES OF NEGOTIATION. THE TWO PHASE CONCEPT WAS

THE ESSENCE OF THE WESTERN POSITION. THUS, THE SUGGESTION FOR A NO-INCREASE COMMITMENT HAD BEEN MADE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE ORIGINAL WESTERN REDUCTION PLAN. IT WOULD NOT CHANGE THE SITUATION AND IT FAILED TO BRING THE NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD. IN THE LAST SESSION, THE BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE HAD EMPHASIZED THAT THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS WERE WILLING TO UNDERTAKE THE NO-INCREASE COMMITMENT FOR THE OVERALL MANPOWER OF THE GROUND FORCES ONLY IF THE OVERALL GOAL OF THE WESTERN PLAN WERE ACCEPTED, A PLAN WHICH WOULD BRING ABOUT A CHANGE IN THE RELATIONSHIP OF GROUND FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE TO THE ADVANTAGE OF THE WEST. IF HE UNDERSTOOD IT CORRECTLY, THE SAME IDEA HAD JUST BEEN PUT FORWARD BY AMBASSADOR ROSE.

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15. KHLESTOV CONTINUED THAT IT WAS THEREFORE DIFFICULT FOR THE EAST TO ACCEPT THE ARGUMENT OF ALLIED REPS WHEN THEY CLAIMED, WHILE DENYING A DESIRE TO SEEK UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGE, THAT THEIR WILLINGNESS TO UNDERTAKE A NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT WAS MEETING THE EAST HALFWAY. IN THIS CONNECTION, EASTERN REPS WOULD LIKE TO RAISE THE POINT ONCE MORE THAT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD OBSERVE THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY IN WORKING OUT ALL MEASURES, PARTICULARLY REDUCTION MEASURES. UK REP HAD ONCE AGAIN MENTIONED THE WESTERN TWO-PHASE PLAN, ONE OF THE BASIC ELEMENTS OF WHICH WAS THE WILLINGNESS TO UNDERTAKE A NO-INCREASE COMMITMENT BETWEEN PHASES, TOGETHER WITH WILLINGNESS TO CONTEMPLATE A REVIEW PROVISION IN THE EVENT THAT THIS SECOND PHASE HAD NO OUTCOME, A RESULT WHICH AMBASSADOR ROSE HAD SAID UNLIKELY. ALL OF THIS WAS DIFFICULT TO ACCEPT AS MIDDLE GROUND. THERE WERE TWO BASIC PLANS BEFORE PARTICIPANTS -- THE WESTERN PLAN AND THE SOVIET PLAN. THE EASTERN PLAN PROVIDES THAT ALL OBLIGATIONS OF THE 11 DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD BE SPECIFIED IN A FIRST AGREEMENT. IN OTHER WORDS, THE EASTERN PLAN PROVIDED FOR CLEAR-CUT OBLIGATIONS FROM THE OUTSET FOR ALL ELEVEN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TO EFFECT REDUCTIONS WITHIN A SPECIFIED TIME, SCOPE, AND DETERMINATION OF THE TYPE OF REDUCTION. WITHOUT MENTIONING ALL OF THE ELEMENTS OF THE WESTERN PLAN WHICH DIFFERED FROM THE EASTERN PLAN, THE WEST HAD IN MIND TO WORK OUT TWO SEPARATE AGREEMENTS IN TWO SEPARATE NEGOTIATIONS.

16. KHLESTOV SAID THAT, AS TO THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET, EAST HAD CLEARLY EXPRESSED THE POINT IN ITS PLAN THAT ALL ELEVEN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD REDUCE FROM THE OUTSET. THE WESTERN PLAN PROVIDED FOR REDUCTIONS FROM THE OUTSET FOR

ONLY TWO DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, THE US AND THE USSR.
THE REMARK WHICH HAD JUST BEEN MADE BY THE UK REP
THAT APPARENTLY THERE WAS A COMMON UNDERSTANDING THAT
AT LEAST THE FORCES OF THE US AND USSR SHOULD BE REDUCED
FROM THE OUTSET WAS NOT AN ACCURATE SUMMARY OF THE ACTUAL
SITUATION. IT WAS TRUE THAT BOTH PLANS CONTAINED THE
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ELEMENT THAT THE US AND SOVIET FORCES SHOULD BE
REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. ON THE SURFACE, ONE MIGHT
ASSUME AGREEMENT THAT THE ARMED FORCES OF THE USSR AND
USA SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. BUT EASTERN
REPS CONSIDERED IT WOULD BE INEQUITABLE TO HAVE ONLY THE
US AND USSR REDUCE FROM THE OUTSET. THEY HAD MADE
REFERENCES TO THE UNEQUAL NUMBERS PROPOSED FOR THE
REDUCTION OF EACH OF THESE FORCES. HE WOULD LIKE
TO EMPHASIZE THAT OF COURSE THE SOVIET ARMED
FORCES OUGHT TO BE REDUCED ALONG WITH THE FORCES OF
OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. BUT HE WISHED ALLIED REPS TO
HAVE FULL AND CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF THE SITUATION
SINCE HE DID NOT BELIEVE THE LANGUAGE USED BY UK REP

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FROM US REP MBFR

WAS FULLY CORRECT.

17. KHLESTOV SAID THAT, THUS, IF THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET IS ADDRESSED, TWO ANSWERS TO THIS QUESTION HAD BEEN GIVEN. THE WEST HAD SUGGESTED US AND SOVIETS. THE EAST HAD SAID ALL ELEVEN SHOULD REDUCE FROM THE OUTSET. THE ISSUE WAS WHAT HAD IN FACT CHANGED IN THESE TWO ANSWERS FOLLOWING THE WESTERN EXPRESSION OF WILLINGNESS TO SEEK MIDDLE GROUND. WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES WERE STILL ANSWERING THE QUESTION IN THE SAME WAY AS BEFORE, THAT ONLY TWO DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD REDUCE FROM THE OUTSET. IT WAS ABSOLUTELY CLEAR, MOREOVER, THAT A NO-INCREASE OBLIGATION DID NOT MEAN AND WAS NOT THE SAME AS AN OBLIGATION TO REDUCE. ALLIED REPS APPARENTLY REMEMBERED PRIOR DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE DIFFERENCES IN A NO-INCREASE OBLIGATION AND AN OBLIGATION
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TO REDUCE. ALLIED REPS HAD THEMSELVES ALREADY INTRODUCED INTO THE DISCUSSION ARGUMENTS THAT A NO-INCREASE COMMITMENT WAS NOT THE SAME AS A REDUCTION OBLIGATION AND DIFFERED ESSENTIALLY FROM IT. IN FACT, THERE WERE REAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN A NO-INCREASE COMMITMENT AND REDUCTIONS, EVEN THOUGH FROM ONE PRACTICAL VIEWPOINT THE DISTINCTION MIGHT BE SMALL IF THE REDUCTIONS TO BE CARRIED OUT WERE NOT LARGE ONES. IT WAS NOT NECESSARY FOR HIM TO REPEAT ALL OF THESE ARGUMENTS SINCE POLISH REP HAD DONE SO IN THE LAST SESSION.

18. KHLESTOV CONTINUED THAT, MOREOVER, IN THAT MEETING, ALLIED REPS HAD SHOWN INTEREST IN REMARKS MADE BY EASTERN REPS AT THAT TIME AND HAD EVEN POINTED OUT THAT THEY WERE WORTH CONSIDERING. NOW THAT PARTICIPANTS WERE WILLING TO PROCEED TO SEARCH FOR AN INITIAL REDUCTION STEP, THE EAST HAD IN MIND AN INITIAL AGREEMENT NOT DIRECTLY CONNECTED WITH THE REDUCTION PROGRAM OF EITHER SIDE, ONE WHICH WOULD COMBINE IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER THEIR INDIVIDUAL ELEMENTS IN A WAY ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH SIDES. AS HE HAD INDICATED, PARTICIPANTS SHOULD SEEK A MIDDLE GROUND SOLUTION TO ALL THREE OF THE QUESTIONS HE HAD DESCRIBED. HE BELIEVED THAT A MEETING OF THE MINDS ON ALL THREE

POINTS WOULD MAKE IT EASIER TO FIND AN ANSWER TO THE FIRST QUESTION, THE ISSUE OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET.

19. WITH THESE POINTS IN MIND, KHLESTOV CONTINUED, HE WOULD LIKE TO SAY THAT AT PREVIOUS SESSIONS EASTERN REPS HAD SPOKEN OF THEIR WILLINGNESS TO WORK OUT A FIRST REDUCTION STEP. EASTERN REPS HAD SUGGESTED THAT A SYMBOLIC REDUCTION MIGHT BE CONSIDERED. IN DOING SO, THEY HAD MADE CLEAR THAT THEY WOULD CONSIDER THIS AS A SEPARATE AGREEMENT BOTH AS REGARDS FORM AND CONTENT. HE WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE THAT THE STEP WHICH EASTERN REPS HAD IN MIND WAS NOT A REDUCTION WHICH WOULD REPRESENT THE FIRST STEP IN THE EASTERN DRAFT AGREEMENT. THEREFORE, ALL CRITICAL REMARKS MADE SO FAR BY ALLIED REPS AGAINST THE SYMBOLIC REDUCTION STAGE AS PART OF THE EASTERN DRAFT AGREEMENT WERE WITHOUT SUBSTANCE IF APPLIED TO THE PRESENT EASTERN SUGGESTION.

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20. KHLESTOV SAID UK REP, IN COURSE OF MARKING INTRODUCTORY REMARKS, HAD INDICATED SEVERAL POINTS WHICH SHOULD BE KEPT IN MIND. AS A MATTER OF FACT, UK REP HAD INDICATED THAT FLEXIBLE APPROACHES TO THE THREE QUESTIONS WHICH WERE THE SUBJECT OF DISCUSSION BY PARTICIPANTS SHOULD BE TAKEN. UK REP HAD ALSO REMINDED PARTICIPANTS OF REMARKS MADE ON LAST OCCASION BY ALL EASTERN REPS TO EFFECT THAT THE EAST WAS WILLING TO SEEK AN INITIAL REDUCTION STEP. UK REP'S REMARKS HAD BEEN PRESENTED FAIRLY CONVINCINGLY. IT WAS UNNECESSARY TO REPEAT THEM. HE WISHED TO EMPHASIZE THAT, NOW THAT PARTICIPANTS HAD BEGUN TO SEEK AN INITIAL REDUCTION STEP, EASTERN REPS WERE NOT INSISTING THAT SUCH A STEP BE MADE ONLY IN THE CONTEXT OF THEIR OWN DRAFT AGREEMENT. IN OTHER WORDS, AT THE PRESENT STAGE OF NEGOTIATIONS, EASTERN REPS WERE PREPARED NOT TO INSIST THAT AN INITIAL REDUCTION STEP SHOULD BE PART AND PARCEL OF THEIR OWN PLAN OF REDUCTIONS. THIS MEANT THAT IN ORDER TO REACH MIDDLE GROUND, ALLIED REPS SHOULD ACT IN THE SAME WAY. THUS, WHEN, AS WAS THE CASE, ALLIED REPS INSISTED ON AN INITIAL REDUCTION STEP IN THE CONTEXT OF THEIR OWN PLAN, THIS WAS NOT EVIDENCE OF A SEARCH FOR MIDDLE GROUND SOLUTION. THEREFORE, IN THE EFFORT TO FIND AN INITIAL STEP, EASTERN REPS WISHED TO REQUEST ALLIED REPS TO JOIN THEM ON MIDDLE GROUND.

21. KHLESTOV SAID HE WOULD NOW LIKE TO SAY A FEW WORDS ON THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. EASTERN REPS HAD CAREFULLY LISTENED TO STATEMENTS OF THEIR WESTERN COLLEAGUES ON THIS TOPIC. EASTERN REPS CONTINUED TO PROCEED ON THE BASIS OF THE

ASSUMPTION THAT THE BASIC PRINCIPLE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, THAT OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY, SHOULD BE CLOSELY CONFORMED TO AT EACH POINT. IN ORDER TO MEET THIS REQUIREMENT AND IN ORDER TO IMPROVE THE ATMOSPHERE BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES, HE BELIEVED THAT THE INITIAL STEP OF REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE MADE BY ALL ELEVEN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. WESTERN REPS WERE FULLY AWARE OF THE SCOPE EAST HAD IN MIND FOR THE FIRST STEP, ABOUT 20,000 MEN ON EACH SIDE. EASTERN REPS HAD ALSO INDICATED THAT IN ORDER TO MEET DESIRES EXPRESSED BY THE WESTERN SIDE, THEY MIGHT GIVE CONSIDERATION TO A DISTRIBUTION OF THIS
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SCOPE OF REDUCTIONS OF SUCH A TYPE THAT THE MAJOR PROPORTION COULD FALL ON THE US AND USSR.

22. KHESTOV SAID THAT JUDGING FROM WHAT HAD JUST BEEN SAID BY UK REP, IT WAS CLEAR THAT PARTICIPANTS WOULD HAVE A COMMON UNDERSTANDING ON TWO POINTS: THAT ALL PARTICIPANTS WERE PREPARED TO MOVE TO A MIDDLE GROUND STEP, AND SECOND, THE POINT MADE BY THE UK REP THAT ALLIES AGREED WITH THE IDEA OF A TIME SCHEDULE UNDER WHICH OBLIGATIONS WOULD BE FULFILLED. PARTICIPANTS STILL HAD TO ESTABLISH WHAT THAT TIMING SHOULD BE AND WHAT WAS THE MIDDLE GROUND AS REGARDS SCOPE. AS EASTERN REPS HAD UNDERSTOOD FROM REMARKS OF WESTERN DELEGATIONS, SUCH AN INITIAL MIDDLE GROUND REDUCTION STAGE MIGHT BE TAKEN IN 1975.

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USNMR SHAPE

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FROM US REP MBFR

WITH THIS AIM IN MIND, CONSIDERATION MIGHT BE GIVEN TO AGREEING ON A TIMETABLE FOR PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION OF REDUCTIONS. IT APPEARED TO EASTERN REPS THAT THE USSR AND USA, AND POSSIBLY SOME OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, MIGHT UNDER THE TERMS OF SUCH A SCHEDULE, BEGIN REDUCTION OF THEIR ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS BEFORE THE REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS DID SO, KNOWING IN ADVANCE THAT BEFORE THE END OF 1975, ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD IMPLEMENT REDUCTIONS OF THE SCOPE AGREED. SINCE THIS WOULD BE AN INITIAL STEP STOOD TO REASON THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS ON FURTHER REDUCTIONS WOULD BE PURSUED. KHLESTOV APPEARED TO HAVE IN MIND THAT THIS SECOND NEGOTIATION WOULD TAKE PLACE CONCURRENTLY WITH IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FIRST STEP.

23. KHLESTOV SAID THAT, AS ALLIED REPS COULD SEE, AT
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THE PRESENT INFORMAL SESSION, THE EASTERN DELEGATES HAD SHOWN FLEXIBILITY AND THE WILLINGNESS TO FIND MIDDLE GROUND SOLUTIONS. EASTERN REPS HOPED THAT THIS FACT WOULD FACILITATE EFFORTS OF PARTICIPANTS IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS AND THAT WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES WOULD SHOW SIMILAR FLEXIBILITY IN MAKING A MOVE OF EQUIVALENT SIGNIFICANCE.

24. US REP SAID SOVIET REP HAD MADE SOME INTERESTING REMARKS AT THE END OF HIS OBSERVATIONS AND THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO ENSURE THAT ALLIED REPS HAD UNDERSTOOD THEM CORRECTLY. AS SOVIET REP HAD POINTED OUT, PARTICIPANTS WERE TALKING ABOUT THE ISSUE OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. AS HE UNDERSTOOD IT, THE SUGGESTION HAD BEEN MADE THAT THE USA AND USSR AND PERHAPS SOME OTHERS WOULD BE IN ONE GROUP WHICH WOULD

UNDERTAKE A COMMITMENT TO REDUCE FIRST. A SECOND GROUP WOULD UNDERTAKE A COMMITMENT TO REDUCE BY THE END OF 1975 IN AN AGREED AMOUNT. SUCH AN INITIAL REDUCTION AGREEMENT WOULD ALSO INCLUDE A PROVISION AS TO FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS ON FURTHER REDUCTIONS. SO THIS WAS A PROPOSAL IN ORDER TO FIND THE MIDDLE GROUND BOTH SIDES SOUGHT ON THE ISSUE OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET.

25. US REP SAID IT MIGHT BE USEFUL TO COMPARE THIS PROPOSAL ON HOW TO REACH MIDDLE GROUND WITH THE MIDDLE GROUND PROPOSAL THE ALLIES HAD MADE IN ORDER TO SEE THE SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO. BOTH PROPOSALS APPARENTLY HAD IN COMMON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THE US AND SOVIETS WOULD COMMIT THEMSELVES TO REDUCE FROM THE OUTSET. THEREFORE, WHAT PARTICIPANTS WERE TRYING TO FIND MIDDLE GROUND ON WAS THE ISSUE OF WHAT OBLIGATIONS THE OTHER NINE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD UNDERTAKE WITH REGARD TO THEIR FORCES. WESTERN REPS HAD SUGGESTED THAT THESE NINE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD UNDERTAKE AT LEAST TWO COMMITMENTS. FIRST, THAT, AS REGARDS THE WESTERN CONTRIBUTION, THEIR FORCES WOULD BE THE FOCUS OF SECOND STAGE REDUCTIONS. SECOND, ALLIED REPS HAD SAID ALLIES WERE WILLING TO UNDERTAKE A NO-INCREASE COMMITMENT COVERING A SPECIFIC PERIOD AND UNDER SPECIFIED CONDITIONS. THESE WERE TWO SIGNIFICANT COMMITMENTS UNDERTAKEN BY THE ALLIES WITH RESPECT TO THEIR FORCES IN
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THE REDUCTION AREA. FOR THEIR PART, EASTERN SIDE HAD JUST SUGGESTED THAT, INSTEAD OF THE MIDDLE GROUND PROPOSED BY THE WEST, EAST WOULD CHARACTERIZE AS MIDDLE GROUND A COMMITMENT BY THE REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TO REDUCE THEIR FORCES BY THE END OF 1975. THE EAST WAS NOW SUGGESTING THAT ONE OR MORE OF THESE REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS MIGHT BE GROUPED WITH THE USSR AND USA, ALTHOUGH THIS WAS NOT FIRMLY ESTABLISHED IN THE BASIC PROPOSAL. THE REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD COMMIT THEMSELVES TO REDUCTIONS BY A SPECIFIC POINT IN TIME, THE END OF 1975.

26. US REP SAID IT MIGHT BE WORTHWHILE TO LOOK AT THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THESE TWO PROPOSED MIDDLE GROUND SOLUTIONS AS REGARDS THEIR EFFECT ON THE REMAINING NINE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. UNDER THE WESTERN MIDDLE GROUND PROPOSAL, IN ADDITION TO UNDERTAKING A COMMITMENT NOT TO INCREASE THEIR GROUND FORCE MANPOWER BETWEEN THE PHASES, THESE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD UNDERTAKE AS A GROUP TO REACH AN AGREED FORCE LEVEL IN THE SECOND STEP. UNDER THE EASTERN PROPOSAL, AS HE UNDERSTOOD IT, ALL REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD UNDERTAKE TO REDUCE THEIR FORCES BY THE END OF 1975 BY SPECIFIED AMOUNTS. FROM

WHAT EASTERN REPS HAD SAID, THESE AMOUNTS WOULD BE SIGNIFICANTLY SMALLER THAN THE REDUCTIONS WHICH WOULD BE TAKEN BY THE US AND SOVIET UNION UNDER THE EASTERN PROPOSAL.

27. US REP SAID ALLIED REPS APPRECIATED THE SPIRIT IN WHICH THIS SUGGESTION HAD BEEN ADVANCED AND CONSIDERED THE SUGGESTION AS EVIDENCE OF A CONSTRUCTIVE SPIRIT ESPECIALLY AS IT REGARDED EASTERN WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY OF POSTPONING OR DEFERRING REDUCTIONS BY MOST IF NOT ALL OF THE REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS.

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AMEMBASSY BONN

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FROM US REP MBFR

28. US REP CONTINUED THAT, FROM HIS PERSONAL VIEWPOINT, AND HIS COLLEAGUES MIGHT WELL HAVE OTHER COMMENTS, THE REASON WHY THIS SUGGESTION, ALTHOUGH CONSTRUCTIVE, WAS NOT REAL OR FAIR MIDDLE GROUND WAS BECAUSE IT STILL REQUIRED THE WESTERN EUROPEAN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TO UNDERTAKE FROM THE OUTSET THE DIFFICULT

POLITICAL COMMITMENT TO REDUCE, AS ALLIED REPS HAD POINTED OUT, THIS WAS MORE DRASTIC, RISKY AND DIFFICULT A COMMITMENT THAN THAT WHICH WOULD BE UNDERTAKEN BY THE US AND SOVIET UNION MERELY BY WITHDRAWING THEIR FORCES. MOREOVER, EASTERN PROPOSAL REQUIRED THESE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TO MAKE THIS COMMITMENT BEFORE THEY HAD THE ASSURANCE WHICH WOULD FLOW FROM THEIR OBSERVATION OF WITHDRAWALS BY THE TWO MAJOR POWERS. HOWEVER, THE SUGGESTION THAT REDUCTIONS BY SOME DIRECT PARTICIPANTS COULD BE DEFERRED WAS A POSITIVE ELEMENT AND HE HOPED PARTICIPANTS COULD CONTINUE TO MOVE FORWARD TOGETHER TO FIND THE ELUSIVE FIAT MIDDLE GROUND.

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29. KHLESTOV SAID IT WOULD BE BETTER IF WESTERN REPS REALLY UNDERSTOOD EASTERN POSITION BECAUSE REMARKS BY UK AND US REPS THAT REDUCTION BY THE US AND SOVIET UNION FROM THE BEGINNING WAS A COMMON APPROACH AND THAT THE ONLY REMAINING QUESTION WAS WHAT OBLIGATIONS WOULD BE UNDERTAKEN BY THE REMAINING COUNTRIES WERE INCORRECT. THE EAST DID NOT SHARE THIS DIVISION OF DIRECT PARTICIPANTS INTO TWO CATEGORIES. THE EAST CONSIDERED THE GROUP OF ELEVEN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS AS A SINGLE ENTITY. THE EAST HAD NOT AGREED THAT ONLY THE US AND THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD REDUCE FROM THE OUTSET, NOR DID THE EAST WISH TO SUBDIVIDE THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS INTO SEPARATE GROUPS. THEREFORE, IT COULD NOT BE SAID THAT IT WAS A COMMON ELEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO POSITIONS THAT THE USSR AND USA WOULD REDUCE FROM THE OUTSET. THE EASTERN APPROACH WAS THAT ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD UNDERTAKE OBLIGATIONS TOGETHER.

30. UK REP SAID ALLIED REPS UNDERSTOOD THIS POINT BUT WHAT HAD INTERESTED THEM WAS THE EASTERN SUGGESTION ABOUT THE TIME-TABLE. ALLIED REPS UNDERSTOOD THAT KHLESTOV'S PROPOSAL MEANT THAT OBLIGATIONS BY ALL ELEVEN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD BE ACCEPTED FROM THE BEGINNING. WHAT INTERESTED ALLIED REPS WAS THE CONCEPT THAT CERTAIN PARTICIPANTS, THE US AND USSR, WOULD AGREE ON REDUCTIONS FROM THE BEGINNING AND THAT THE COMMITMENT BY OTHERS TO REDUCTIONS WOULD BE A COMMITMENT TO LATER REDUCTIONS. THIS MEANT THAT DIFFERENT TYPES OF OBLIGATIONS WOULD BE ACCEPTED BY THE US AND USSR ON THE ONE HAND AND OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS ON THE OTHER.

31. UK REP SAID THE DISCUSSION THUS FAR HAD BEEN ABOUT OBLIGATIONS TO BE ASSUMED FROM THE OUTSET. US REP HAD BEEN FACTUALLY CORRECT WHEN HE SAID THAT ALL AGREED THAT THE US AND USSR SHOULD REDUCE FROM THE OUTSET. IT WAS NOT HARD TO SEE THAT WHERE THE PARTICIPANTS DIFFERED ON THIS ISSUE WAS THE QUESTION OF WHAT SORT OF OBLIGATIONS SHOULD BE ASSUMED FROM THE OUTSET BY REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. SOVIET REP CLAIMED ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD BE TREATED AS A SINGLE GROUP AND THAT ALL SHOULD REDUCE FROM THE OUTSET. BUT SOVIET REP HIMSELF HAD QUALIFIED

THIS BY STATING EAST WAS PREPARED TO SPLIT DIRECT PARTICIPANTS INTO TWO GROUPS, THE FIRST COMPOSED OF THE US AND USSR AND THE SECOND OF OTHERS WHO WOULD REDUCE AT A LATER DATE. THIS APPROACH SEEMED TO CONTAIN ELEMENTS OF SIMILARITY WITH WESTERN
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IDEAS. HE WAS NOT SUGGESTING THAT PARTICIPANTS HAD YET REACHED MIDDLE GROUND, BUT HE WAS SUGGESTING THAT THERE WAS AN IDEA HERE WHICH MIGHT BE FURTHER DEVELOPED.

32. UK REP SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO ASK A QUESTION. APPARENTLY, OF THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS THERE WOULD BE TWO GROUPS WHO WOULD UNDERTAKE DIFFERENT OBLIGATIONS FROM THE OUTSET, THOSE WHO REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET, AND THOSE WHOSE REDUCTIONS WOULD BE DEFERRED. DID SOVIET REP ACCEPT THIS DISTINCTION AS HE DEFINED IT?

33. KHLESTOV SAID HE FELT ALL EASTERN REPS COULD CONFIRM THAT WHAT THEY SUGGESTED HAD BEEN DULY APPRECIATED BY THEIR COLLEAGUES AND THIS WAS EVIDENCE THAT EAST HAD MADE A SIGNIFICANT SUGGESTION. THE SECOND POINT HE WOULD WISH TO EMPHASIZE WAS THAT EAST BELIEVED THAT THEY HAD NOW PRODUCED A THIRD ANSWER TO THE QUESTION WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET, AN ANSWER WHICH WAS NOT A WESTERN ANSWER NOR AN EASTERN ANSWER, BUT A THIRD WAY AND THE BASIS FOR A TENTATIVE SOLUTION. WHAT EAST HAD PROPOSED WAS A COMPROMISE SOLUTION AND A DEPARTURE FROM THE ORIGINAL EASTERN PROPOSAL. CONCERNING UK REP'S QUESTION AS TO WHETHER EAST DIVIDED PARTICIPANTS INTO TWO GROUPS WITH REGARD TO THE NATURE OF THE OBLIGATIONS THEY ASSUMED, EASTERN REPS BELIEVED ALL PARTICIPANTS SHOULD REDUCE FROM THE OUTSET. BUT FOR THE SAKE OF COMPROMISE AND TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT WESTERN VIEWS ON THIS SUGGESTION, EAST HAD SUGGESTED SOMETHING WHICH MIGHT LEAD PARTICIPANTS TO A MIDDLE GROUND SOLUTION. EAST HAD SUGGESTED THIS AS AN INITIAL STEP WHICH WOULD ENABLE ALL PARTICIPANTS TO MOVE THE NEGOTIATION FORWARD. HOWEVER, EAST DID NOT WANT ALLIED REPS TO GAIN THE IMPRESSION THAT EAST WAS PREPARED TO DIVIDE ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS INTO TWO GROUPS FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF UNDERTAKING DIFFERENT OBLIGATIONS. THE EASTERN PROPOSAL WAS ALREADY A COMPROMISE PROPOSAL WHICH MIGHT BE ACCEPTED BY WEST AS AN INITIAL STEP AND WHICH MIGHT BE CARRIED OUT IN 1975. BUT, IF WESTERN REPS ATTEMPTED TO INTERPRET EASTERN SUGGESTION INTO THE IDEA THAT EAST WAS PREPARED TO DIVIDE THE PARTICIPANTS INTO TWO GROUPS, THIS WAS NOT AN ACCURATE UNDERSTANDING OF THE EASTERN PROPOSAL. AFTER ALL, THE EASTERN PROPOSAL WAS ALREADY A COMPROMISE PROPOSAL, NOT A BASIC PROPOSAL. IT WAS AN EFFORT TO MEET THE WEST ON A MIDDLE GROUND. HE WISHED TO MAKE THIS POINT PERFECTLY CLEAR.
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FROM US REP MBFR

IF ALLIED REPS MAINTAINED THAT EAST WAS WILLING TO DIVIDE PARTICIPANTS INTO TWO CATEGORIES, THIS DID NOT CHANGE THE BASIC EASTERN PRINCIPLE THAT ALL PARTICIPANTS HAD EQUAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES. THE PROPOSAL HAD BEEN MADE IN ORDER TO SHOW FLEXIBILITY AND TO MEET WEST HALF WAY, BUT THIS DID NOT CHANGE EAST'S BASIC APPROACH.

34. UK REP SAID ALLIED REPS UNDERSTOOD WHAT KHLESTOV HAD SAID ABOUT THERE BEING NO CHANGE IN PRINCIPLE IN THE EASTERN POSITION, BUT HE WISHED TO MAKE ONE COMMENT ON KHLESTOV'S INITIAL REDUCTION STEP. KHLESTOV HAD POINTED OUT THAT THERE WERE TWO BASIC PLANS, A WESTERN PLAN AND AN EASTERN PLAN. KHLESTOV HAD SUGGESTED THAT WEST HAD

AGREED WITH EAST THAT ALL PARTICIPANTS SHOULD SEARCH FOR AN INITIAL REDUCTION STEP. VARIOUS FORMULAE AND TERMS HAD BEEN USED BY PARTICIPANTS IN THE TALKS THUS FAR TO
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DESCRIBE WHAT MIGHT BE DONE FIRST. FOR EXAMPLE, THERE WAS AN "INITIAL REDUCTION STEP;" A "FIRST INITIAL STEP;" A FIRST STAGE IN THE EASTERN PLAN; AND THE WESTERN PROPOSAL FOR A FIRST PHASE. ALL OF THESE TERMS, AS EVERYONE UNDER-

STOOD, INVOLVED FINDING ANSWERS TO THE THREE QUESTIONS KHLESTOV HAD MENTIONED ON THE LAST OCCASION AND WHICH UK REP HAD REFERRED TO IN HIS REMARKS IN THE PRESENT SESSION. PARTICIPANTS HAD AGREED BEFORE STARTING THIS SERIES OF INFORMAL MEETINGS THAT THEY SHOULD NOT TRY AT ONE AND THE SAME TIME TO TACKLE THE ANSWERS TO ALL OF THESE QUESTIONS. RATHER, THEY HAD AGREED THAT THEY SHOULD TAKE ONE BY ONE THE VARIOUS ELEMENTS IN ANY FIRST PHASE, OR STEP, OR WHATEVER IT WAS CALLED AND SHOULD DO SO WITHOUT PREJUDICE

TO THE REMAINING PROPOSALS OF EITHER SIDE. IT HAD BEEN AGREED ANSWERS TO ALL THREE QUESTIONS WOULD HAVE TO BE TENTATIVE. THIS WAS BECAUSE THEY WOULD DEPEND ON FINDING A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION TO A WHOLE COMPLEX OF QUESTIONS. ONLY WHEN THESE ANSWERS HAD BEEN FOUND COULD ONE PUT TOGETHER WHAT HE HAD EARLIER REFERRED TO AS A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE PACKAGE. UK REP SAID HE WISHED TO MAKE THESE REMARKS IN ORDER TO MAKE CLEAR THE POINT FROM WHICH PARTICIPANTS WERE TALKING: PARTICIPANTS WERE DISCUSSING THE FIRST OF THE THREE QUESTIONS KHLESTOV HAD MENTIONED, THAT OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. ALLIED REPS FULLY UNDERSTOOD THAT WHEN EAST PROPOSED A POSSIBLE ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION, IT WAS DOING SO WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THEIR OWN BASIC PRINCIPLES, JUST AS WHEN WEST MADE PROPOSALS THEY DID SO WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THEIR PRINCIPLE.

35. GDR REP SAID THAT CONCERNING THESE REMARKS ABOUT PRINCIPLES, THE EASTERN POSITION WAS VERY CLEAR. UK REP HAD JUST MENTIONED THAT WEST UNDERSTOOD THAT THE EASTERN APPROACH WAS NOT TO LINK NOR COMBINE THE INITIAL STEP JUST PROPOSED TO THE ENTIRE CONTENT OF THE EASTERN DRAFT AGREEMENT AND ITS UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES. HOWEVER, EVERYTHING EASTERN REPS SAID WAS BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY, WHICH HAD TO UNDERLIE ALL AGREEMENTS SOUGHT BY PARTICIPANTS INCLUDING THE IDEA OF AN INITIAL STEP. THE NEED FOR APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE
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OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY AT EVERY STEP AND STAGE HAD BEEN SET FORTH IN THE AGREED COMMUNIQUE. THUS, EAST WAS NOT ABANDONING THIS BASIC PRINCIPLE. AS CONCERNED THE ADEA OF A FIRST INITIAL STEP, ON WHICH EAST HAD JUST SHOWN ITS FLEXIBILITY ONCE MORE, THIS IDEA STARTED OFF FROM THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY IN A NEW WAY. APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE IN THE PRESENT CASE MEANT THAT ALL PARTICIPANTS UNDERTOOK EQUAL OBLIGATIONS IN THE INITIAL STEP. EQUAL OBLIGATIONS MEANT EQUAL OBLIGATIONS TO REDUCE FORCES. HOWEVER, IT HAD BEEN EXPLAINED THAT THERE WOULD BE ROOM TO THINK ABOUT THE AMOUNT AND THE TIMETABLE. THIS EASTERN PROPOSAL DIFFERED FROM THE PRESENT WESTERN APPROACH, WHICH WAS DIRECTLY LINKED WITH THE ORIGINAL WESTERN APPROACH ACCORDING TO WHICH THE REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD OBLIGATE THEMSELVES ONLY TO NEGOTIATE IN A SECOND PHASE. THE WESTERN PROPOSAL DIFFERED FROM NEW EASTERN PROPOSAL IN THAT ACCORDING TO THE LATTER, THE REMAINING PARTICIPANTS WOULD UNDERTAKE AN OBLIGATION TO REDUCE. IT WAS A POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT THAT WESTERN REPS APPRECIATED FLEXIBILITY SHOWN BY EAST. AT THE SAME TIME, IT WAS ONLY JUST FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY THAT ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD UNDERTAKE OBLIGATIONS ON REDUCTIONS WHICH WERE CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS AND THAT THEY SHOULD NOT MERELY UNDERTAKE AN OBLIGATION TO NEGOTIATE IN THE SECOND PHASE.

36. CANADIAN REP SAID ALLIED DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WERE READY AND WILLING TO UNDERTAKE SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS AFTER PRIOR REDUCTIONS BY THE GREAT POWERS HAD CREATED THE NECESSARY CONFIDENCE AND ASSURANCE. CANADIAN REP SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO ASK SOME QUESTIONS TO CLARIFY SOME REMARKS JUST MADE BY KHLESTOV. HIS FIRST QUESTION WAS, WAS IT CORRECT THAT THE IDEA JUST EXPRESSED BY KHLESTOV COULD MEAN THAT ONLY THE US AND SOVIET FORCES WOULD BE REDUCED FIRST? KHLESTOV HAD SAID THAT OTHERS MIGHT BE INCLUDED, BUT THIS APPARENTLY WAS NOT A CONDITION. CANADIAN REP HAD ASKED THIS QUESTION BECAUSE UK REP IN HIS SUMMARY HAD ALSO DRAWN THIS CONCLUSION. HE WISHED TO CONFIRM WHETHER IT WAS CORRECT. SECOND, WOULD KHLESTOV CONFIRM THAT US AND USSR WOULD TAKE MAJOR PORTION OF REDUCTIONS. HIS THIRD QUESTION WAS THAT KHLESTOV HAD JUST SPECIFIED 1975 AS THE TIME FOR REDUCTIONS BY THE REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. WAS THERE ANY FLEXIBILITY IN EASTERN THINKING ON THIS POINT, OR MUST REDUCTIONS OF ALL TAKE PLACE IN 1975? FINALLY, WAS IT CORRECT THAT THE INITIAL STEP

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THAT EAST HAD PROPOSED IN PRESENT SESSION WOULD TAKE THE PLACE OF THE FIRST STAGE OF THE EASTERN NOVEMBER 8 DRAFT AGREEMENT?

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FROM US REP MBFR

37. KHLESTOV SAID HE WOULD REPLY TO THESE QUESTIONS. FIRST, EAST COULD NOT SHARE WESTERN CONCEPT OF CONFIDENCE. HE WISHED ALLIED REPS TO UNDERSTAND EASTERN VIEWS ON THIS SUBJECT WHICH EASTERN REPS HAD REPEATED MANY TIMES, BUT WHICH ALLIED REPS HAD APPARENTLY FAILED TO GRASP: THE EAST NEEDED THE SAME AMOUNT OF CONFIDENCE AS THE WEST. NETIERH EASTERN POPULATIONS NOR EASTER GOVERNMENTS WOULD UNDERSTAND THAT US AND SOVIET FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED WHILE THE REMAINDER DID NOT REDUCE. CONFIDENCE COULD EMERGE ONLY IF ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS UNDERTOOK THE OBLIGATION TO REDUCE. IT WOULD NOT EMERGE IF SOME COUNTRIES DID NOT UNDERTAKE THIS OBLIGATION. TO MENTION ONLY ONE POINT WHERE CONFIDENCE WAS REQUIRED, THE WEST HAD ITS OWN APPRAISAL OF WARSAW PACT. BUT WARSAW PACT HAD ITS OWN APPRAISAL OF NATO AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE FOR IT. IN THIS CONTEXT WHEN

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CANADIAN REP SAID THAT SOME PRIOR REDUCTION STEP SHOULD BE TAKEN SO THAT CANADA AND OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS COULD HAVE ADEQUATE CONFIDENCE TO REDUCE THEMSELVES, EAST WAS WILLING TO LISTEN TO THESE REMARKS AND TO TAKE THEM INTO ACCOUNT. BUT ALLIED REPS SHOULD UNDERSTAND EASTERN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND EASTERN PUBLIC OPINION REQUIREMENTS. EAST BELIEVED THAT IF ALL 11 PARTICIPANTS ASSUMED AN EQUAL OBLIGATION TO REDUCE, THIS ACTION WOULD CREATE CONFIDENCE FOR ALL. EAST CONSIDERED THAT IF ALL FOUR EASTERN COUNTRIES WITH FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE WOULD REDUCE, THIS WOULD STRENGTHEN WESTERN CONFIDENCE. WEST SHOULD TAKE SIMILAR STEPS TO STRENGTHEN EASTERN CONFIDENCE. EASTERN REPS COULD HARDLY ACCEPT WESTERN POINT OF VIEW WHEN ALLIED REPS CLAIMED THAT FOR CANADA OR WESTERN EUROPE TO HAVE THE NECESSARY CONFIDENCE, THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD TAKE SOME PRIOR STEPS. HE DID NOT WISH TO DWELL ON THIS TOPIC, SINCE OTHERWISE HE WOULD HAVE TO SAY THAT THE ENTIRE POLICY OF THE USSR SERVES THE AIM OF CREATING CONFIDENCE. BUT IF ADDITIONAL STEPS WERE NECESSARY FOR CONFIDENCE, THEN ALL PARTICIPANTS SHOULD TAKE THESE STEPS IN ORDER TO BUILD THE CONFIDENCE OF ALL. THE SITUATION AT PRESENT WAS THAT OF 7 WESTERN COUNTRIES, ONLY ONE WAS NOW PREPARED TO TAKE STEPS TO INCREASE CONFIDENCE WHILE ALL OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES WERE READY TO DO SO. IT HAD BEEN NECESSARY TO CLARIFY THIS QUESTION SINCE CANADIAN REP HAD REPEATED IT BUT PARTICIPANTS DID NOT NEED THIS TYPE OF DISCUSSION NOW. THEY SHOULD CONCENTRATE ON SUBJECT OF MIDDLE GROUND SOLUTION.

38. KHLESTOV SAID THAT AS REGARDS FIRST QUESTION BY CANADIAN REP, IT REFERRED TO HIS STATEMENT THAT THE US AND USSR AND PERHAPS SOME OTHER COOUNTRIES MIGHT IN TERMS OF SUCH A SCHEDULE BEGIN AND REDUCE BEFORE OTHERS DID THE SAME. EAST WAS PREPARED TO DISCUSS THAT IDEA TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT WESTERN VIEWS. THIS IDEA WAS TIED TO THE ELABORATION OF A REDUCTION SCHEDULE. SO THAT IF WEST REALLY SUPPORTS THAT IDEA -- AND HE UNDERSTOOD THIS TO BE SO FROM WHAT UK REP SAID ON PRESENT OCCASION -- EAST MIGHT BE WILLING TO GO INTO DISCUSSION OF THESE NUANCES.

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AS FAR AS CANADIAN REP'S SECOND QUESTION ABOUT SIZE OF INITIAL STEP OF EASTERN PROPOSAL, EASTERN REPS HAD ALREADY SAID THAT THEIR PROPOSAL WAS TO REDUCE 20,000 MEN ON EACH

SIDE. EASTERN REPS HAD ADDED THAT THEY WERE PREPARED TO LISTEN TO WESTERN VIEWS ON THAT SCORE. THEREFORE IN THIS RESPECT ALSO, THE EASTERN POSITION WAS CLEAR.

39. KHLESTOV SAID AS REGARDS THE THIRD QUESTION BY CANADIAN REP, LATTER ASKED HOW FLEXIBLE EAST WAS AS REGARDS THE YEAR 1975. EAST HAD UNDERSTOOD THAT A REDUCTION SCHEDULE FOR 1975 CONFORMED TO WESTERN VIEWS. EAST HAD JUST MADE ONE FLEXIBLE STEP. NOW CANADIAN REP WAS ASKING FOR STILL MORE FLEXIBILITY. PARTICIPANTS SHOULD FIRST DISCUSS EASTERN PROPOSAL. AS REGARDS LAST QUESTION RAISED BY CANADIAN REP PARTICIPANTS WERE TALKING OF SOME COMPROMISE. AS UK REP HAD POINTED OUT, PARTICIPANTS WOULD ALSO NOT ABANDON THEIR OWN BASIC APPROACHES.

40. DISCUSSION THEN CONCLUDED AND IT WAS AGREED THAT NEXT SESSION SHOULD TAKE PLACE ON JUNE 25. RESOR

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Message Attributes

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Channel Indicators: n/a
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Concepts: NEGOTIATIONS, FORCE & TROOP LEVELS, MUTUAL FORCE REDUCTIONS
Control Number: n/a
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Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: golinofr
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
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Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
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Review Authority: golinofr
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